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Abstract
Building sustainable and resilient societies is a multidimensional challenge that affects achievement of the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development. In crises and disasters, civil protection authorities typically use emergency powers and a
command-and-control approach to manage resources and to design and implement disaster management interventions.
They centralise knowledge, technologies and responsibilities for prevention, mitigation and monitoring, while stifling the
capacities of local communities to reduce disaster risks and impacts. The mechanism they enact leads to a poor under-
standing of the capacities of local people to learn and transform, and of how community wellbeing, vulnerabilities, and
resilience influence disaster risks. The mechanism does not strengthen the role of local communities in disaster risk reduc-
tion. Instead, it facilitates disaster capitalism at all levels of society. Drawing on the disaster risk reduction and resilience
paradigm and on our analysis of the disaster management interventions conducted before and after the 6 April 2009 earth-
quake in L’Aquila, Italy, we discuss the main constraints to implementing the four Priority Areas in the Sendai Framework
for Disaster Risk Reduction: (1) Understanding risk in its multiple dimensions; (2) strengthening disaster risk governance;
(3) investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience; and (4) enhancing preparedness and build back better in response,
recovery and reconstruction. We discuss how top-down, emergency-centred civil protection approaches create second
disasters, and fail in all four priorities. We suggest that shifts in paradigm and investment are required in disaster manage-
ment and development practice from centralised civil protection systems to decentralised, socially sustainable community
empowerment systems.
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1. Introduction
For over 30 years, disasters have not been considered
as external to societies, but as multidimensional phe-
nomena that must be understood in the context of
socially-produced vulnerabilities and risks (Oliver-Smith,
Alcántara-Ayala, Burton, & Lavell, 2017). This still cur-
rent understanding reflected a shift in disaster man-
agement thinking from the previous ‘war approach’ to
full consideration of the social dimensions of disasters
(Perry & Quarantelli, 2005; Quarantelli, 1998). It also led
the United Nations to establish a disaster risk reduction
(DRR) and resilience paradigm that should be the basis of
all disastermanagement and development interventions
in all countries. This DRR and resilience paradigm advo-
cates reducing vulnerabilities and risks, enacting gen-
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uine community engagement and empowerment, and
building local community resilience in disaster manage-
ment and development practice (International Decade
for Natural Disaster Reduction, 1994; United Nations
Disaster Relief Organization, 1982; United Nations Office
for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2005, 2015). According to
the DRR and resilience paradigm, rather than be mere
spectators of the activities carried out by others, affect-
ed communities should have a role in and responsi-
bility for DRR and resilience; and, rather than be pro-
tected from disasters, they must be actively includ-
ed in and empowered by all planned interventions.
Increasing recognition of the role of local communi-
ties (and of their risks, vulnerabilities, and resilience)
has led to a change in thinking about responsibility for
DRR and resilience from a government to a governance
approach (Beratan, 2007; Clark-Ginsberg, 2020; Cutter
et al., 2008; Gall, Cutter, & Nguyen, 2014a, 2014b; Parra
& Moulaert, 2016; Tengö, Brondizio, Elmqvist, Malmer,
& Spierenburg, 2014; Tierney, 2012). The governance
construct highlights that, beyond traditional government
institutions, there is a wide range of diverse national and
local actors that have roles and responsibilities in rela-
tion to DRR and resilience building (Gall et al., 2014a,
2014b; Tierney, 2012; United Nations Office for Disaster
Risk Reduction, 2017).
The theoretical shifts in disaster management
thinking—from a war approach to considering the social
dimensions of disasters; and from a government to a
governance approach—were followed by a shift in dis-
aster management practice from civil defence to civil
protection (Alexander, 2002). Although increasing atten-
tion has been given in the disaster management litera-
ture to the need to engage local communities and facili-
tate community resilience, the shift from government
to governance never truly happened. Discrepancies
between theory and practice remain in the way disas-
ter management and development interventions are
carried out by States, especially those States that rely
on top-down, emergency-centred civil protection sys-
tems (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019a, 2019b, 2020a, 2020b;
Lavell & Maskrey, 2014). Myths, misconceptions and
mistakes persist, especially in the ways civil protec-
tion authorities manage the risks and impacts asso-
ciated with crises and in the ways they interpret the
behaviour of local communities (Imperiale & Vanclay,
2016a, 2019a, 2019b; Tierney, 2003; Tierney, Bevc, &
Kuligowski, 2006). Despite the United Nations Disaster
Relief Organization (1982) report, Shelter After Disaster,
the Yokohama Strategy (International Decade for Natural
Disaster Reduction, 1994), the Hyogo Framework for
Action (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction,
2005), and the Sendai Framework (United Nations Office
for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015), governments and
their civil protection agencies still fail to value the contri-
bution of local communities, and instead promote cen-
tralized technological command-and-control solutions to
the detriment of local people and to their capacities to
learn and transform (Clark-Ginsberg, 2020; de la Poterie
& Baudoin, 2015; Gaillard & Mercer, 2012; Wright,
2016). Furthermore, local risk mitigation and monitor-
ing, essential public services and other forms of support
to enhance community wellbeing were gradually dis-
mantled, especially in the most vulnerable and remote
regions, wheremaintaining such services was not consid-
ered efficient or politically convenient (de la Poterie &
Baudoin, 2015; Gaillard & Mercer, 2012; Wright, 2016).
As a result, despite the many United Nations declara-
tions, there are still gaps in capacity, knowledge and
financing that undermine DRR and resilience outcomes,
especially at the local level (United Nations Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction, 2017).
In past decades, the disaster governance strate-
gies undertaken by governments and civil protection
agencies—i.e. strategies for risk management, financing,
community participation, physical planning, and institu-
tional arrangements (see Jha et al., 2010)—have large-
ly not been conceptualised or subject to critical social
analysis because disaster management actions were
generally seen as morally worthy and the issues they
addressed were seen as exceptional rather than normal.
Furthermore, media coverage and academic discourse
has largely remained trapped in an untheorized consen-
sus that recovery and reconstruction after disaster are
good and beyond reproach (deWaal, 2008). There is only
limited research on the institutional constraints to gen-
uinely empowering communities and enhancing inclu-
sive social learning and socially sustainable transforma-
tion at the local level (Amundsen, 2012; Eriksen et al.,
2011; Gall et al., 2014a, 2014b).
This article is part of a larger research project that
looked at the social dimensions associated with the
6 April 2009 L’Aquila earthquake and the disaster man-
agement interventions carried out before and after the
disaster (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2016a, 2016b, 2019a,
2019b, 2020a, 2020b). The overall project used a wide
range ofmethods, including: action anthropology; partic-
ipant observation; fieldwork discussions; public forums;
focus groups; fieldnotes; surveys; document analysis;
media analysis; 37 retrospective, in-depth interviews
with key informants; and over 250 interviews with peo-
ple in local communities undertaken between 2009 and
2018. In this reflection paper, drawing on our analysis
of the failures of top-down civil protection approach-
es (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019a, 2019b, 2020a, 2020b)
and using Jha et al. (2010), we discuss the main barriers
and constraints in typical disaster governance to imple-
menting the four Priority Areas for Action outlined in the
Sendai Framework (United Nations Office for Disaster
Risk Reduction, 2015): (1) understanding disaster risk
in all its multiple dimensions; (2) strengthening disas-
ter risk governance to manage disaster risk; (3) invest-
ing in DRR for resilience; and (4) enhancing disaster pre-
paredness for effective response, and to build back bet-
ter in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction (United
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015). At the
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time of writing this article (mid 2020), the Covid-19
pandemic has made understanding the constraints that
hinder States from enhancing DRR, building communi-
ty resilience, and fully aligning their efforts in the four
Priority Areas more crucial than ever.
2. Understanding Disaster Risk (Priority 1) versus
denying the Multiple Dimensions of Risk
To enhance DRR and resilience, the United Nations
recommended understanding risk in all its dimensions,
specifically vulnerability, capacity, exposure, and hazard
characteristics (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk
Reduction, 2015). Such an understanding should be orga-
nized by a comprehensive riskmanagement strategy that
informs all other strategies and disaster management
and development interventions. In the L’Aquila Province,
before and after the earthquake, there were vulnerabili-
ties, risks, and exposure of persons and assets, but there
were also needs, capacities, and knowledge to reduce
disaster risks. However, the disaster management inter-
ventions that were implemented by the Italian State
through its national and local civil protection authori-
ties had only a narrow understanding of disaster risk,
and failed to conceive, design and implement appro-
priate pre-disaster and post-disaster activities, as we
describe below.
For several months before the fatal earthquake, an
earthquake swarm was threatening the life, health and
wellbeing of people in L’Aquila Province (Imperiale &
Vanclay, 2019a). During this time, Giampaolo Giuliani, a
scientistworking at theGran SassoNational Laboratories,
was making predictions about likely earthquakes. These
predictions increased the awareness of the local com-
munities about disaster risk. For some, this increasing
awareness was a source of anxiety or concern; for others,
it was accompanied by a growing awareness of worsen-
ing vulnerabilities in the local built environment. By liv-
ing in an environment at risk, local people were learn-
ing that their hazard exposure and vulnerability were
increasing. Therefore, they started to care about safety.
They learned how vulnerable people were most at risk,
and they felt responsibility towards them. Local schools
were often closed as a precaution. During the earthquake
swarm, many local people made comments at body cor-
porate meetings about the worsening of cracks in their
building. They demanded building inspections and to see
civil protection plans, asking for effective strategies to
reduce local vulnerability and risks, and to enhance local
preparedness and emergency plans. However, instead
of responding to community demands and appreciat-
ing community resilience, the risk management strategy
of the authorities was initially to deny the existence of
any risk, and later to reassure people that nothing was
going to happen. The only risks they considered were
the alleged anxiety and alarmism of the local population,
which they argued had to be suppressed (Imperiale &
Vanclay, 2019a).
A press release issued by the Abruzzo civil protec-
tion on the morning of 30 March 2009, which was
a key piece of evidence in a court case (Imperiale &
Vanclay, 2019a; Tribunale di L’Aquila, 2012), stated that
no more tremors were foreseen. Paradoxically, there
was a 4.1 earthquake that very afternoon. The press
release caused much embarrassment for the national
Department of Civil Protection (DCP). Together with the
attention Giuliani’s predictions were getting, this creat-
ed unease within the DCP, which led to it convening a
meeting of the national Major Risk Commission (MRC)
the next day. Rather than listen to local people, the inten-
tion of theMRCmeetingwas to reassure them that every-
thing was under control. This attitude of contempt that
the authorities had towards local people was very evi-
dent in a recorded phone conversation when the DCP
Chief said that the purpose of the MRC meeting was to
“shut up any imbecile, [and] calm down any conjectures
and worries” (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019a). Officially, the
MRC scientists were being asked to “carefully analyse the
scientific and civil protection issues related to the seis-
mic sequence occurring in L’Aquila Province” (Imperiale
& Vanclay, 2019a; Tribunale di L’Aquila, 2012, p. 94).With
this Termsof Reference, theDCPexpected that there be a
risk assessment only in terms of the likelihood of a strong
earthquake in the short term, rather than any considera-
tion of risk in all its multiple dimensions.
The poor state of buildings in L’Aquila and the risks
associated with the vulnerabilities of the local built envi-
ronment were known for at least 20 years (Barberi,
Bertolaso, & Boschi, 2007; Boschi, Gasperini, &Mulargia,
1995). In the local community, there were other local sci-
entists who, well before the earthquake, played a key
role in managing local seismic monitoring stations, and
in producing reports and academic papers about the seis-
mic hazard in the region and the vulnerabilities of local
buildings. In 1999, a local scientist (De Luca, Marcucci,
Milana, & Sano, 2005) had highlighted the high seismicity
of L’Aquila city and the presence of an important amplifi-
cation factor. None of this knowledge was considered by
the DCP and it was actively excluded by the composition
and conduct of the MRC (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019a).
In the way the MRC meeting was conducted, the
assessment of local vulnerabilities and the inclusion of
local knowledge and capacities were considered to be
irrelevant. The vulnerabilities of the local built environ-
ment, especially as noted by local residents, were not
considered, and people’s requests to see civil protection
plans were not answered. The local public health system,
municipal services, professional associations, building
firms, NGOs, local scientists, and other formal and infor-
mal groups and individuals were excluded from assess-
ing and reducing local disaster risk. DRR activities were
considered merely as matters of public order and con-
trol that required police action, rather than as matters
of enhancing community wellbeing and reducing local
vulnerabilities. During the MRC meeting, the local civ-
il protection agency was only asked if they were tak-
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ing action against people spreading unfounded rumours.
There was no discussion about local civil protection or
emergency plans, about the capacities and vulnerabili-
ties of the local health care system, or about any plan
to enhance local DRR, or to strengthen community pre-
paredness and resilience (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019a).
The result of this was that, despite the over-reaction of
the State at the national level after the earthquake, at
the local level there was complete unpreparedness, as
graphically explained by an interviewee:
Nothing, nothing! Do you fully appreciate the signif-
icance of nothing [sai che vuol dire niente]?...That
night there was an absence of everything. The
first ambulances…were to be seen…perhaps only at
around 6 am [over 2.5 hours after the earthquake].
There was no water, firefighters were very few…it was
a city abandoned unto itself. There was nothing…The
city of L’Aquila, on the night of the earthquake, was a
city in which who was afraid was afraid, who was not
was not, and it went like it went…It was [a city] totally
unprepared…and guess what, even part of the hospi-
tal was damaged.
The 6.3 Mw earthquake damaged more than 35,000
buildings, 309 people died, some 1,600 people were
injured, and more than 70,000 people were rendered
homeless. Analyses of damage (Augenti & Parisi, 2010)
and deaths (Alexander & Magni, 2013) revealed poor
design, poor-quality building materials, and shoddy
workmanship. One of the major contributing factors was
the inadequacy of the prevailing building codes, and the
limited extent towhich theywere enforced. The (not) sur-
prising outcome was that the newer reinforced concrete
frame buildings accounted for 79% of deaths (Alexander
& Magni, 2013). Eight people died in a student dormi-
tory. Here, the death toll would have been much high-
er except that many students had left due to their fear
of an impending earthquake and their awareness of the
increasing vulnerability of the building. This dormitory
became a focal point for the outpouring of grief, both
real and feigned (“Terremoto dell’Aquila,” 2013).
After the earthquake, no risk or impact assessment
informed the top-down planning used by national and
local civil protection authorities to implement and man-
age emergency tent camps, temporary housing schemes,
disaster rubble, safety measures, demolitions, or recon-
struction interventions. All their interventions failed
to consider the social dimensions of disaster in the
recovery, reconstruction and re-development processes.
The lack of any risk or impact assessment led to the
design of interventions that did not consider the envi-
ronmental, social or human rights impacts on community
wellbeing. This also led to a lack of consideration of the
local vulnerabilities and risks that post-disaster interven-
tions could exacerbate, thus worsening local social exclu-
sion and inequity, leading to a second disaster.
3. Strengthening Disaster Risk Governance (Priority 2)
versus exacerbating Social Exclusion
Disaster risk governance should be led by “a clear vision,
plans, competence, guidance and coordination with-
in and across sectors, as well as participation of rele-
vant stakeholders” at the community, regional, nation-
al, and international levels (United Nations Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015, p. 17). This vision should
be enabled by effective institutional and participa-
tion strategies through which everyone can learn, act,
and positively transform towards enhancing DRR and
resilience in prevention, preparedness, response, recov-
ery, and reconstruction activities. However, in L’Aquila,
the Italian State and its civil protection systemused emer-
gency powers and amilitary-type, command-and-control
approach. This approach contained a strict decision-
making process that was closed to the public, and
failed to develop a clear, participatory plan and to ade-
quately coordinate the DRR and resilience activities of
all relevant stakeholders. Such an approach perpetu-
ated business as usual and facilitated disaster capital-
ism at the local and national levels, hindering social
learning and transformation towards better DRR and
resilience outcomes.
Before the earthquake, the governance strategy of
the DCP was to use emergency procedures to rapid-
ly convene the MRC meeting to assess disaster risk in
the L’Aquila Province. The strict command-and-control
approach meant that the meeting was closed to the pub-
lic. The conclusions of the MRC scientists were intend-
ed to be confidential advice to the DCP and local civil
protection authorities. Local scientists, local knowledge
and local actors were all excluded. Discussing, designing
and implementing participatory plans to reduce local vul-
nerabilities and risks, and to enhance local community
resilience and preparedness, were considered irrelevant
(Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019a).
After the earthquake, a complex set of institution-
al arrangements and immediate actions were imple-
mented by all levels of government, including the over-
whelming militarization of the affected region and the
establishment of restricted areas (red zones). The pri-
mary governance mechanism was the declaration of a
State of Emergency, which was left in place for three
years, an extraordinary long time (Khakee, 2009; Venice
Commission, 1995). A Department of Command and
Control was established and became the extraordinary
government of the affected area, which became known
as the crater. The State of Emergency accorded the DCP
with emergency powers, specifically the power of injunc-
tion (i.e., to issue ordinances on behalf of the govern-
ment) and the power of exception (i.e., derogation of
ordinary rules and requirements), in effect giving the
DCP the ability to act unilaterally (Imperiale & Vanclay,
2019b, 2020a).
Use of emergency powers and the command-and-
control approach does not require engagement of local
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communities. In the short and mid-term response and
recovery actions implemented by the DCP, only the local
mayors and their trusted technicians were consulted.
For the temporary housing scheme that was implement-
ed (i.e., the CASE project), the DCP used a consultation-
command-and-control approach in which all decisions
around the project were made by the DCP in consul-
tation with the L’Aquila Mayor and two professionals
the Mayor had appointed using emergency procedures.
The L’Aquila Council and the local communities were
excluded fromdecision-making related to the emergency
tent camps or temporary housing, which was not based
on any housing needs assessment (Imperiale & Vanclay,
2019b, 2020a, 2020b).
After 10 months, the Department of Command and
Control was replaced by a new temporary government
entity called the Struttura Tecnica di Missione (STM,
whichmeans something like ‘Technical Support Agency’),
which was intended to support the Abruzzo Region
President and the L’Aquila Mayor in relation to recon-
struction efforts. Amongst some controversy, the then
President of the National Association of Building Firms,
Gaetano Fontana, was appointed as its coordinator.
The STM liaised with the Office of Public Works of the
Ministry of Public Infrastructure and Transport. However,
from the perspective of local people and the local coun-
cils, the change from the Department of Command
and Control to the STM did not lead to any funda-
mental change to the command-and-control approach.
Furthermore, a senior staff member in the Office of
Public Works was known to have close links to organised
crime (“Guglielmi,” 2010).
The State granted local political leaders with emer-
gency powers so that they could implement ‘urgent mea-
sures,’ a term that was applied to a wide range of tasks.
This did not lead to the strengthening of local democratic
governance. Numerous national laws, and prime minis-
terial, civil protection, regional and mayoral ordinances
and decrees enabled derogation from ordinary public
procurement and oversight procedures, anti-mafia con-
trols, environmental and public health safeguard policies,
and led to disenfranchisement of the local democratic
governance. Changes in these ordinances and decrees
over time, particularly those related to reconstruction,
created differences in treatment, and confusion and
alienation for most people, especially the most vulner-
able. Underlying interests, the top-down procedures
implemented, and the command-and-control approach
meant that there was an institutional ignorance and
denial about the desirability of community engagement
in recovery and reconstruction processes (Imperiale &
Vanclay, 2020a, 2020b).
4. Investing in DRR for Resilience (Priority 3) versus
facilitating Disaster Capitalism
Public and private investments in DRR and resilience
are crucial to enhance “the economic, social, health
and cultural resilience of persons, communities, coun-
tries and their assets, as well as the environment,” and
they must be “cost-effective and instrumental to save
lives, prevent and reduce losses, and ensure effective
recovery and rehabilitation” (United Nations Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015, p. 19). To achieve posi-
tive DRR and resilience outcomes, there needs to be an
adequate financial strategy to ensure accountability and
transparency. This should enable multiple actors across
the public and private sectors to enact mutual learn-
ing and solid partnerships for shared outreach of DRR
and resilience outcomes and follow-up (United Nations
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015). Such partner-
ships must embrace equity and social inclusion as prin-
ciples, means and outcomes, and develop strategies to
enhance the wellbeing of all members of local commu-
nities, especially the most vulnerable. However, before
the L’Aquila earthquake, there was no investment in DRR
and resilience interventions. After the earthquake, the
phenomenal investments in response, recovery, recon-
struction, and development activities were not account-
able or transparent, nor equitable or inclusive. Theywere
not informed by any DRR and resilience outcomes, by
any socially sustainable empowerment strategy, or by
any inclusive participation. Furthermore, the activities
were hijacked by local and national elites, which facilitat-
ed disaster capitalism, worsened social risks (e.g., rent-
seeking, elite capture, organised crime infiltration and
corruption), exacerbated inequity and local vulnerabili-
ties, resulting in a second disaster.
Before the earthquake, many expensive technical
reports concerning the vulnerability of the local built
environment were produced, but led to no DRR and
resilience outcomes. Although these reports cost mil-
lions of euros each, they were not co-produced or
transformative at the local community level, and they
were largely ignored by local and national institutions
(Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019a). After the earthquake,
major interventionswere funded and implementedwith-
out being considered by the Italian Parliament. During
the three years of the State of Emergency, the DCP
and local authority figures were provided with unlimited
access to financial resources, which weremade available
by the State through the Civil Protection Fund, an emer-
gency fund that can be drawn upon whenever a State
of Emergency is declared. There was very little control
over use of this fund, and it was automatically topped up.
The actions were undertaken using emergency powers,
and were covered by state secrecy provisions (Imperiale
& Vanclay, 2019b, 2020a).
Although no-bid contracts had already been crit-
icised as avenues for disaster capitalism (Button &
Oliver-Smith, 2008; Damiani, 2008; Imperiale & Vanclay,
2020a; Klein, 2007), in L’Aquila local and national author-
ity figures made considerable use of them. Only six days
after the earthquake, the government directly allocat-
ed €300,000 to a private foundation to develop the
idea of a temporary housing scheme (the CASE project).
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On 28 April 2009, the State allocated €200 million to
ANAS spa (the partly State-owned road construction
company) and €100 million to the Italian railway net-
work. With these funds and the freedom provided by
the emergency powers, ANAS and the Italian railway net-
work implemented projects they had previously planned,
but without any public scrutiny and without having to
adhere to the normal social, environmental and cultural
heritage protection arrangements (Imperiale & Vanclay,
2020a). The cost of the emergency tent camps and hotel
accommodation was phenomenal, amounting to around
€2.8 million per day. The cost of the CASE project was
also excessive. A lack of transparency and accountability
meant that there was inconsistent reporting. For exam-
ple, the European Court of Auditors (2012) reported that
the total cost of the CASE project was €597million, equiv-
alent to over €1,648 per square metre of living accom-
modation, or 158% more than the normal market cost
for a pre-fabricated apartment, or 27% more than a nor-
mal residential apartment (European Court of Auditors,
2012). Søndergaard (2013), however, reported that the
total cost of the CASE project was €809million. In an offi-
cial report about the costs of the post-disaster interven-
tions, the Italian Minister for Territorial Cohesion from
2011 to 2013, Fabrizio Barca (2012), indicated that the
total cost was €833 million (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019b).
With the implementation of the State of Emergency,
the existing anti-mafia procedures were suspended.
In response to journalist questioning about this, a nation-
al law decree (Italian Government, 2009) was issued on
28 April 2009 to implement anti-mafia arrangements.
However, unlike most other regulatory actions which
applied immediately, these anti-mafia provisions only
came into force three months later (Italian Government,
2009). Furthermore, the text of the new arrangements
was vague and potentially enabled the provisions to be
by-passed. In any event, it was all too late: safety mea-
sures, shoring-up, demolitions, temporary housing solu-
tions and rubble removal, transport and disposal were
already being implemented (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2020a).
At least five firms with known mafia connections had
already been engaged in the CASE project implemen-
tation (Galullo, 2009; Libera, 2010; Postiglione, 2010).
In May 2009, a quarry owned by a local construction
firm with alleged links to the mafia was selected as a
site for rubble storage, and €10 million was allocated as
payment (Libera, 2010). Funds were directly allocated to
influential local building firms to complete the construc-
tion of unoccupied apartments to make them ready for
use. This was part of a complex housing scheme, called
the AQ ethical fund, which was perceived by many as an
ad-hoc scheme conceived by local building firms to avoid
expropriation of the over 3,000 unoccupied apartments
they owned (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2020a). Moreover, the
extent of and speed by which safety measures were
implemented in the L’Aquila city centre were phenome-
nal. In less than 6 months, the whole red zone of L’Aquila
city was ‘put into safety’. The red zone was carved-up
into districts and assigned to various influential local and
national building firms. Local authorities made exten-
sive use of no-bid contracts to appoint building firms
to demolish buildings, design and implement shoring-
up solutions, manage disaster rubble, and design recon-
struction of public buildings, including schools, church-
es, and other heritage properties (Imperiale & Vanclay,
2020a, 2020b).
In relation to implementing safety measures and rub-
ble management, there was an intricate system of cor-
ruption, in which payments were made by building com-
panies to bogus consulting firms belonging to local pub-
lic officials (Orsini, 2016). With the local officials having
unrestricted access to the Civil Protection Fund, and not
having to provide the State with any official financial
statements, as well as a complete lack of monitoring and
accountability, this comprised an ideal situation for graft
and corruption to flourish. To give some impression of
the scale of this, the total cost of the shoring-up solu-
tions and demolitions was over €628 million. Since the
earthquake, there have been many legal actions relat-
ing to allegations of fraud, corruption, bribery, and inad-
equate public administration, which implicated nation-
al and local public officers and building firms (Fidone,
2017; Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019b, 2020a). A European
Parliament report (Søndergaard, 2013) and an Italian par-
liamentary inquiry (Bindi, 2018) confirmed the extensive
infiltration by organized crime. In June 2014, a crimi-
nal investigation coordinated by the local branch of the
national anti-mafia organisation led to the arrests of
building entrepreneurs for their linkages to the mafia
(“L’Aquila,” 2014). A major issue relating to this was
that the safety measures implemented drew attention
and resources away from reconstruction (Imperiale &
Vanclay, 2020b).
Overall, there was nothing in the financial strategy to
prevent disaster capitalism and organised crime from tak-
ing hold, or social exclusion and inequity frombeing exac-
erbated, instead there were arrangements that enabled
the elites to hijack the interventions and for disaster cap-
italism to flourish. The state secrecy provisions, lack of
disclosure, and derogations associated with the State of
Emergency, served to hide dubious arrangements, dis-
guise fraud and corruption, and facilitate disaster capital-
ism and organized crime infiltration (Imperiale & Vanclay,
2019b, 2020a, 2020b).
5. Enhancing Preparedness and Build Back Better
(Priority 4) versus Top-Down Planning
Post-disaster interventions are critical opportunities to
build back better not only housing and infrastruc-
ture, but also more resilient and sustainable societies
(United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015).
Building back better can be achieved through ensur-
ing that equitable and universally-accessible prepared-
ness, response, recovery, reconstruction, and develop-
ment strategies are in place, and that DRR and resilience
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is integrated into development, thus making nations and
communities more resilient to disasters (United Nations
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015). In L’Aquila, how-
ever, the centralized command-and-control approach
adopted by the local and national authorities led to
top-down planning that exacerbated local vulnerabilities,
risks, and the social pre-conditions of disasters, thus fail-
ing to enhance DRR and resilience and to build back bet-
ter more sustainable and resilient communities.
Before the earthquake, one issue that exacerbated
vulnerability in L’Aquila was that the seismic zoning and
building codes had not been updated for many decades.
Despite scientific knowledge of the high seismicity risk
of the L’Aquila area (Boschi et al., 1995; De Luca et al.,
2005; Stucchi et al., 2004), in the national seismic classi-
fications issued in 1984 and 2003, L’Aquila was still con-
sidered as only being of moderate seismicity (since 1927,
see Stucchi, Meletti, Rovida, D’Amico, & Capera, 2010).
Since the end of the 1990s, several studies outlined that
many reinforced concrete frame buildings, notably the
local hospital, were highly vulnerable because L’Aquila
had an outdated building code (Di Pasquale, Dolce, &
Martinelli, 2000; Nuti & Vanzi, 1998). A consequence of
this was that, for many decades, poor quality construc-
tion and speculative building had been facilitated. Other
issues that exacerbated local vulnerability were: lobby-
ing by builders to influence local urban planning poli-
cies; weak local governance; and a poor local culture of
planning (Alexander, 2010; OECD, 2013). This is evident
in the fact that, in 1951 there were 54,633 inhabitants
within 500 hectares of built-up area, whereas in 2001,
68,503 inhabitants lived on over 3,100 hectares of built-
up area. While the population increased by 25%, land
consumption increased six times (Frisch, 2010). The lax
building regulations, overconfidence about the growth
potential of the region, and other incentives led to there
being around 3,000 unoccupied apartments in the City
of L’Aquila at the time of the earthquake.
The earthquake was not used as a window of oppor-
tunity to ‘build back better,’ and it did not lead to any
local institutional change in terms of good land utilisa-
tion or DRR and resilience. After the earthquake, land
consumption increased exponentially. The CASE project
alone led to the expropriation of over 6,000 allotments,
including over 100 hectares of farmland, causing irre-
versible damage to local agriculture (Forino, 2015; Frisch,
2010; Imperiale&Vanclay, 2019b). In August 2011, a new
regional law was introduced to address DRR and inform
reconstruction. However, rather than be an opportuni-
ty to correct the manifestly-inappropriate seismic rat-
ing, Regional Law n.28 (Abruzzo Region, 2011) recon-
firmed L’Aquila City as being in a moderate seismic zone.
Nevertheless, Regional Law n.28was intended to require
the implementation of a process of ‘seismic autho-
rization’ and monitoring for all restoration work and
new building construction. However, arbitrary postpone-
ments, orchestrated bureaucratic delays, and various
revisions to the law, including the ability to modify the
plans after approval, meant that this seismic authoriza-
tion and monitoring was not effectively implemented.
Rather than facilitate local change and build a culture
of DRR and resilience, the top-downplanning used by the
State exacerbated disaster impacts and local pre-existing
vulnerabilities and risks. For example, the management
of the emergency shelter arrangements created social
fragmentation and exclusion, neglected local community
resources, capacities, and resilience, and increased local
people’s dependence on external assistance (Imperiale
& Vanclay, 2019b). The CASE project was implement-
ed without any community needs assessment, or any
environmental, social, or human rights impact assess-
ment. It created urban sprawl and impacts on landscape,
water quality, agricultural production, health and well-
being, further exacerbating social disintegration, anomie,
homelessness, the loss of sense of place, depression, and
other disaster impacts (Alexander, 2010; Calandra, 2016;
Ciccozzi, 2016; Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019b). Despite its
phenomenal cost, the poor quality of construction mate-
rials and other deficiencies of the CASE project creat-
ed dangerous situations, including leaking pipes, water
seepage, fires due to faulty electric systems, and the
improper use of flammable materials. All this led to over
10% of the CASE apartments being declared unfit for
habitation. This also led to many people being forced
to relocate elsewhere, creating further hardship, stress,
and psychological trauma. Furthermore, the phenome-
nal cost of maintenance and the many shortcomings in
construction and energy use has meant that the CASE
project is an ongoing liability for the local municipality
and the residentswhohave to bear the burdenof its inad-
equacies (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2019b).
After the earthquake, the State granted local politi-
cal leaders emergency powers to implement urgentmea-
sures including: the identification of existing or new land-
fill sites for rubble disposal; disaster rubblemanagement;
implementation of safety measures and demolitions;
design of local reconstruction strategies; and recon-
struction of public buildings, including heritage prop-
erties (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2020a). As with the CASE
project, these actions were implemented through emer-
gency procedures without any environmental, social, or
human rights impact assessments, nor by any assess-
ment of the long-term sustainability of these activi-
ties. Very curiously, various national agencies and local
authority figures used the emergency powers to imple-
ment normal projects, such as the building of a bridge,
and the enhancement of local roads and the railway,
without having to observe normal procedures for pro-
curement or impact assessment, and without consult-
ing the local councils or local communities (Imperiale &
Vanclay, 2020a).
All disaster rubble was considered and managed
as normal urban waste, including otherwise dangerous
waste such as sewage from the portable toilets in the
tent camps and the rubble fromcollapsed buildings, even
though the rubble would have contained high levels of
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asbestos and other pollutants. The National Law Decree
(Italian Government, 2009) allowed all activities related
to disaster rubble management to be conducted with-
out regard to anti-mafia controls or the environmen-
tal management procedures normally required, such as
environmental impact assessment, assessment andmon-
itoring of risk, safety measures, protection of groundwa-
ter at waste disposal sites, and public health and safety
standards (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2020a). Shoring-up solu-
tions and demolitions were conducted without respect
for local people’s human right to property, without ade-
quate consideration of the environmental and social
sustainability of these measures in the mid to long
term, without any care regarding materials that could
have been reused (e.g., historic stones and planks), and
without any regard to the possessions of inhabitants
(Imperiale & Vanclay, 2020a, 2020b).
An issue of major concern to local inhabitants was
the restoration of local school buildings, and the lack of
DRR measures implemented in that process. After the
earthquake, across the whole of the crater, 21 schools
were classified ‘E’ (i.e., uninhabitable), and classes were
relocated to temporary buildings. 11 years after the
earthquake, none of these schools have been recon-
structed, and over 3,600 students (about 60% of the stu-
dents in the city) still go to school in temporary build-
ings (Ciuffini, 2018). Some 23 school buildings were clas-
sified ‘B’ (temporarily uninhabitable) and were restored
through emergency procedures. In January 2017, some
students together with their parents and teachers
founded the Committee for Safe Schools (Comitato
Scuole Sicure) to complain about the vulnerability of
these schools and to claim the right to have safer
schools. This committee lamented that these schools
were poorly restored, without implementing any ade-
quate seismic retrofit. Through a formal Freedom of
Information request, the Committee discovered and pub-
licly revealed that the L’Aquila Province was aware of
the structural vulnerability of these schools and was
deliberately hiding this information. Subsequently, an
inquiry of the local newspaper, Il Centro, revealed that
of 1287 school buildings in the Abruzzo region, only 417
had been assessed for seismic risk. Of these, 391 school
buildings (93%) were unsafe (“Abruzzo,” 2017).
Overall, after the earthquake, local and national civ-
il protection authority figures implemented a top-down
physical planning strategy through the use of emergen-
cy powers and a command-and-control approach. Such
a strategy led to top-down planned interventions that
did not consider the social dimensions of post-disaster
operations. Rather than be considered as windows of
opportunity to pursue inclusive social learning and social-
ly sustainable transformation towards better DRR and
resilience outcomes, post-disaster interventions did not
lead to any positive change at the local level. These inter-
ventions perpetuated business as usual, facilitated rent-
seeking, elite capture, organised crime infiltration, disas-
ter capitalism, and corruption. This exacerbation of social
risks worsened local inequity and social exclusion, and,
instead of building back better, led to interventions that
created further environmental, social, and human rights
risks and impacts, exacerbating local pre-disaster vulner-
abilities and the social pre-conditions of disaster, there-
fore resulting in second disasters (Imperiale & Vanclay,
2019b, 2020a, 2020b).
6. Conclusion
We live in a global risk landscape that is characterised by
biological, geo-physical, environmental, macroeconom-
ic, technological, societal and geopolitical risks, which,
over the last two decades, have been increasing in their
extent, intensity and frequency. Earthquakes, abnormal
weather events, wildfires, landslides, pandemics, and sit-
uations of environmental or social injustice are some
of the risks, which, together with other global stres-
sors (e.g., biodiversity loss, climate change, deforesta-
tion, desertification, financial crises, globalization, land
degradation, migration, resource scarcity, rising sea lev-
el), constitute the global risk landscape in which we live.
When these risks turn into disasters, they create dev-
astating impacts on local communities, their wellbeing,
and their environments. At the time of writing this arti-
cle (mid 2020), the Covid-19 pandemic has made this
global risk landscape more evident than ever. Due to
the current global crisis, States must undertake imme-
diate action at community, national, and international
levels to reduce the risks. It is all too evident that the
four Priority Areas of the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction need to be fully implemented: (1) under-
standing risk in all its multiple dimensions; (2) strength-
ening disaster risk governance; (3) investing in DRR for
resilience; and (4) enhancing preparedness and build
back better.
For each Priority Area, this article highlighted the fail-
ures of the Italian State and its top-down, emergency-
centred civil protection system. What the L’Aquila case
showed is that the paternalistic attitude States still have
towards local communities is completely inadequate to
fully understand the positive and negative social pro-
cesses within affected communities. These community
dynamics can contribute to either reducing or exacer-
bating disaster risks and impacts at all levels of society.
Consequently the positive characteristics of communi-
ties should be strengthened while the negative charac-
teristics should be mitigated.
This paternalistic attitude leads decision-makers to
consider the sharing of knowledge concerning disaster
risks as a source of collective anxiety and/or unjustified
alarmism thatmust be suppressed. It also leads to regard-
ing DRR mitigation and monitoring as mere technical
activities that, rather than be everyone’s business, are
considered to be only the business of the commander-
in-charge, and something from which local communi-
ties must be kept out of the way. The paternalistic atti-
tude and the command-and-control approach leads to
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the accumulation of knowledge, technologies, resources,
and responsibilities only in certain pockets of control,
while hindering the broader constituency of society from
participating, benefiting, and learning from past failures
and the root causes of disasters. All this prevents any
chance of understanding the multiple dimensions of risk,
building democratic disaster governance, investing in
resilience, or facilitating a socially sustainable transfor-
mation towards achieving better DRR and resilience out-
comes at all levels of society.
As is revealed inmost disasters around theworld, the
top-down, emergency-centred, command-and-control
worldview States frequently have leads decision mak-
ers to respond to disaster risk by using ‘the four
stage strategy’ that was made famous by the BBC TV
series, Yes, Minister (Allen, Lotterby, & Whitmore, 2016):
(1) nothing is going to happen; (2) something is going to
happen, but we should do nothing about it; (3) maybe
we should do something about it, but there is nothing
we can do; and (4) maybe there was something we could
have done, but it is too late now. Similar to this Four Stage
Strategy, as the L’Aquila disaster clearly revealed, States:
deny the existence of any risk; accept the existence of
risks but seek to reassure the population that everything
is under control; ignore vulnerabilities and the root caus-
es of disasters that must be reduced; and when the dis-
aster occurs, they over-react using centralised, military-
type, top-down arrangements that fail to engage commu-
nities, perpetrate business as usual, protect the interests
of the elites, and exacerbate the root causes of disaster.
Extrapolating from the L’Aquila situation, it is clear
that socially sustainable transformations are needed in
the way that States: understand risk in all its multiple
dimensions; organise their governance and investments
to reduce risks and build resilience; and plan preven-
tion, preparedness, recovery, reconstruction and devel-
opment interventions to build back better. A switch
from centralised, emergency-centred civil protection
to more decentralised, socially sustainable communi-
ty empowerment systems is crucial. Such decentralised
community empowerment systems must avoid denying
the existence of risk, and over-reacting after disasters.
Furthermore, these systems should build a sustainable
risk governance at all levels of society. This sustain-
able risk governance should enhance understanding of
the social dimensions of disasters. It should also recog-
nise, engage, and strengthen local people’s capacity to
learn from local vulnerabilities, social risks and disaster
impacts, and to positively transform towards enhancing
community wellbeing.
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